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Abstract
We show by a simple example that in a public goods economy consisting of identical
individuals with symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences the core of the economy does not
con-verge to the Lindahl solution when the number of agents goes to infinity. This confirms
in an elementary way that the Edgeworth conjecture does not necessarily hold in an economy
with a public good.
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 1. Introduction 
The Lindahl equilibrium is the most prominent cooperative solution in a public goods econ-
omy. Being based on price-taking behaviour of the agents it clearly parallels the competitive 
allocation in a private goods economy. In addition, there is a further analogy with the private 
goods case since the Lindahl solution belongs to the core of the economy, which means that 
no subgroup of agents can attain a Pareto improvement by separating and providing the public 
good by using their own endowments alone (see Foley, 1970). But unlike a market economy, 
in which the core converges to the competitive equilibrium, the core of a public goods econ-
omy (for a general description see Weber and Wiesmeth, 1990) does not necessarily shrink to 
the Lindahl equilibrium if the original economy is replicated infinitely often, i.e. the “Edge-
worth conjecture” does not hold in the public goods case. This important result, which robs 
the Lindahl solution some of its distinctiveness among Pareto optimal allocations, has been 
shown by Muench (1972), Milleron (1972, pp. 460-483), Champsaur et al. (1975), or Ellick-
son (1978) by rather intricate examples which indeed give the impression that it “is difficult to 
provide an accessible formal demonstration” (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 303) for the non-
convergence of the core in a public goods economy. In this note we, however, want to show 
that it is possible to provide an elementary example that, like Milleron’s (1972) more sophis-
ticated example, is based on identical Cobb-Douglas preferences and a linear technology for 
producing the public good.  
 
2. The Example 
Consider an economy consisting of 2n individuals  1,...,2 in =  that all have the same income 
1 i y =  and the same Cobb-Douglas utility function  ( , ) ii uxG x G = , where  i x  denotes individ-
ual i’s private consumption and G  is public good supply. The public good is produced by a 
constant returns to scale economy for which the marginal rate of transformation between the 
private and the public good is normalised to one. The aggregate budget constraint therefore is 
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In this situation the (symmetric) Lindahl solution  12 ( ) ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
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ii xn y ==  for all agents  1,...,2 . in =           For  an  arbitrary  n we now consider another Pareto optimal allocation 
12 ( ) ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ))
AA A
n An x n x n G n = , in which public good supply clearly must be  ( )
A Gn n =  
()
L Gn =  but the public good contributions differ between two groups of individuals of equal 
size n, the high and the low contributors. We assume that in each  () An the public good con-
tribution of a high contributor is 
5
8
 and that of a low contributor only is 
3
8
. Thus, independent 
of n, private consumption in  () An is  () 3 / 8
A
h xn =  for a high and  () 5 / 8
A
l xn =  for a low con-










l un n =  for high and low contributors, 
respectively.  
         In order to show that each allocation  () An is in the core of the economy we assume that 
a coalition consisting of  0 k ≥  high contributors and  0 m ≥  low contributors leaves the alloca-
tion  () An and provides the public good solely by use of its own income, which in total is 
km + . In an efficient standalone allocation  (, ) Skm of this separating group public good sup-





=  which is smaller than public good supply  ( )
A Gn n =  in  () An. There-
fore, if a low contributor is not to be worse off in  (, ) Skm as compared to  () An she needs a 
private consumption level that is higher than  () 5 / 8 .
A
l xn =  Then, however, there must be at 
least some high contributor  j  for whom private consumption in  (, ) Skm is below 
 
(2)                         











Otherwise the budget constraint (1) would be violated. Thus, the following estimate for agent 
j’s utility  (, )
S
j uk m  in  (, ) Skm can be given: 
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 This shows that at least one member of the coalition must be worse off after the deviation 
which means that the coalition cannot block  () An. Since this argument holds for an arbitrary 
coalition,  () An is in the core independent of the size of n. Obviously, the allocation  () An is 
quite distinct from the Lindahl solution for all n which confirms that the core of the specific 
public good economy considered here does not converge to the Lindahl equilibrium when n 
goes to infinity. 
      This example can be easily generalized in the following way: Assume again that, in the 
identical situation as considered in the previous example, there are again two groups of low 
and high contributors each consisting of n individuals. In the original allocation  () An private 
consumption of a high contributor  ()
A




z ∈ , such that private consumption of a low contributor  ()
A
l x n  becomes 
1
1( , 1 )
2
z −∈ . 
By a calculation quite analogous to that in our numerical example it can be shown that, inde-
pendent of the size of n, the allocation  () An is in the core if and only if 
1
4
z ≥ , i.e. the 
chance for finding a coalition that is able to block the original allocation is increased when the 
distribution of private consumption becomes more skewed. This generalization also shows 
that the core of a public goods economy may contain a great many of allocations even if the 
size of the economy goes to infinity. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In the Cobb-Douglas framework it is also possible to provide other counterexamples to the 
Edgeworth conjecture that also could be treated as not too demanding exercises in an inter-
mediate Public Finance course. So, if an economy consisting of two agents with the same in-
come levels but different Cobb-Douglas preferences is replicated it turns out that public good 
supply in the Lindahl solution and the Moulin egalitarian-equivalent solution (see Moulin, 
1987) may diverge when the number of replications is increased (see Buchholz and Peters for 
the calculations in this case). But as it is known as a general fact, that not only the Lindahl 
solution but also the Moulin solution always is an element of the core this observation implies 
as well that the core of the economy does not shrink to the Lindahl solution when the size of 
the economy goes to infinity. But note that, even though the Edgeworth conjecture is not valid 
in many simple cases it nevertheless may hold true also in a public goods economy when spe-
cific assumptions on preferences are additionally imposed (see Conley, 1994, for such posi-
tive results on core convergence in a public goods economy). Acknowledgements: We thank Andreas Graichen and Jan Schumacher for helpful comments.  
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